INTRODUCTION
In the United States in the post-11 September era, the state began to address Muslim Americans as religious individuals and Islam as a religion. Contrary to many sociological conceptions of the United States as a secular state that is neutral and non-interfering with regard to religion, there is emerging evidence that the state is seeking to constitute religious identities tied to patriotic citizenship, promote particular religious meanings and foster an 'American Islam' in the service of the US-led 'war on terror'. In contrast to Samuel Huntington's theory of a 'clash of civilizations' it has become popular to argue that there is a clash within Islam and this notion has become integral to the Bush administration's global 'war on terror'. Although this discourse of internal religious struggle is flexible and contested, it consistently sees religion as a core determinant of the current geopolitical context and maintains the United States as largely external to the sources of conflict. Rather, the United States represents itself as a place of tolerance where 'true' Islam can thrive. However in producing this image and implicitly promoting specific religious positions, the US proves itself to be invested in constituting an 'American Islam' in opposition to other 'enemy' versions of Islam. In this process, those who do not abide by a state-supported definition of Islam are constructed as anti-modern, un-American and potentially dangerous.
This article analyzes these state tactics and their effects through an investigation of (1) discourses of the state, especially statements made by the president immediately after 11 September; (2) policy papers advocating specific state positions toward Islam by the RAND Corporation, an independent think tank founded in 1945 to meet the research needs of the US Armed Forces and largely focused on geopolitics and security; and (3) the US State Department's engagement with particular domestic Muslim spokespeople to project an image of the United States abroad. I analyze these 'war on terror' discourses primarily in terms of how they may be productive, constituting certain subject positions and social relations. While securing secularism, understood as the exclusion of politics from religion, is one articulated justification of the 'war on terror', it masks the secular state's role in producing specific religious subjects and delimiting the boundaries of religion.
THE SECULAR STATE RECONSIDERED
In the last two decades, sociologists have seriously debated the continued validity of secularization theory that saw the marginalization of religion from political and social life as a natural outcome of 'modernization'. 1 Casanova (1994: 7) has usefully sought to clarify the beleaguered theory by narrowing its scope and identifying its 'defensible core'. He argues that while modernization does not necessarily lead to the decline of individual religiosity (as a highly religious US population demonstrates) or the marginalization of religion within society (as increasingly public or 'de-privatized' religions around the globe demonstrate), it does lead to the functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres, such as the state, economy and science, from religion. Therefore while Casanova's secularization theory relies on a concept of separate spheres for state and religion, he argues that religion can have a public role within 'civil society'. However, for Casanova, a religion can only retain the descriptor of 'modern' if it respects modern liberties and does not involve itself in party politics and the workings of the state.
Finding that in the United States religion's role has been generally confined to the civil sphere, Casanova maintains the US as 'the paradigmatic form of a modern secular, differentiated society' (Casanova 2006: 23) . 2 As such, Casanova's theory is consistent with other sociological analyses which have described the United States as founded on separation of church and state, particularly through the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religion and prohibition on the establishment of a state religion.
3 This context is seen as having facilitated religious pluralism that allows 'consumers' to freely select among a variety of religious options (Berger 1967; Wuthnow 1988) leading to persistent high levels of religiosity in the United States (Martin 2005) . Such analyses do capture a particular dynamic that has distinguished the US from many Western European countries. However, if one takes a broader view of how state power is articulated, one finds a more complicated context where 'free' consumer choice is no more free in the realm of religion than in most arenas of modern life. I am inspired by Asad's (2003) close genealogy of the secular which highlights the ways in which the religious and the secular are complexly intertwined and how various articulations of state power are concerned with delineating the boundaries of what is considered secular or religious.
Rather than rely on a clear distinction between state and civil society, my analysis draws on Foucault's (1991) conception of governmentality which makes clear that state power is found not only in the law's threat of violence, but also in techniques of knowledge collection and population administration that draw on and incorporate various institutions of 'civil society'. Although states often do limit religious expression by legalistic means, they can also do so via civil society institutions and by structuring the 'civil sphere' such that it excludes or differentially incorporates particular religious subjects (Asad 2006 ). Casanova's conception of modern religion is already a specific kind of religion, as Asad has noted, one that 'is able and willing to enter the public sphere for the purpose of rational debate with opponents who are to be persuaded rather than coerced ' (2003: 183) . While Casanova presents 'modern religion' as a natural product of modernization, he does not analyze the forms of state power involved in producing and managing it.
In contrast to normative or evolutionary conceptions of secularization typical of many such theories, Smith (2003) has argued that it is more helpful to see the secularization of specific spheres of public life in the United States as the outcome of a series of struggles that have been neither predetermined nor inevitable. For example, US legal history demonstrates a complicated relationship between the state and religion including the courts' active engagement in delineating and defining religion (Sikkink 2003) . Particularly since 1965, as new religious groups have brought forward their claims, courts have had to determine what beliefs are 'religious', when they are sincerely held and which specific practices are 'central' to one's faith. These courts often have operated from an implicitly Protestant perspective, seeing the 'core' of religion as belief rather than actions, privileging 'individual consciousness over collective religious authority' and seeing religion as a primarily private matter (Bender and Snow 2006: 197 -8) . Blatant bias is also not uncommon, as Moore's (1995) analysis of cases involving Muslim prisoners demonstrates, finding, for example, that some courts have gone so far as to deem Islam a 'sham religion', and noting that requests for pork substitutes were more likely to be deemed required when made by Jewish, rather than Muslim, inmates. What these and other legal cases highlight is that secularism may in fact require the state to become intimately involved in the religious. 4 More to the point, the secular state establishes its authority in the process of delineating the boundary between the 'secular' and the 'religious', even if in the name of protecting each from the other (Asad 2003) .
Nevertheless, it is a context of apparent 'religious freedom' and lack of state interference in religion that is referenced by some US Muslim reformists as indicating that the United States is where Islam's universal truths can be accessed, without the incursions of politics or culture (see, e.g., Wolfe 2002) . This is also the discourse that the Bush administration has drawn upon in its depiction of the United States as offering free and neutral ground on which 'true' Islam can thrive, in contrast to places that are said to foster violent 'misappropriations' of Islam. This discourse not only glosses a much more complicated US context, but also produces a particular conception of what religion is or should be.
THE WAR FOR ISLAM
This enemy falsely claims that America is at war with Muslims and the Muslim faith, when in fact it is these radicals who are Islam's true enemy . . . We must help millions of Muslims as they rescue a proud and historic religion from murderers and beheaders who seek to soil the name of Islam.
( 6 In effect, he claims to represent the moral high-ground even in relation to a faith that he does not claim as his own.
Of course, statements about religious values and God have long been part of public discourses in this country as Bellah (1991 Bellah ( [1970 ) pointed out in his analysis of presidential speeches. He favorably assessed these references as an essential aspect of civil society that were nonsectarian in tone, aspiring toward universality of scope and, although derived from Christianity, not specifying uniquely Christian concepts. However, Bellah's analysis of civil religion as pushing the nation to aspire to and judge itself by higher (transcendent) standards cannot account for Bush's discourse on Islam, which draws on a religion that the majority of the US population does not consider a relevant moral standard for their actions. Rather, his quotations from the Qur'an serve as justifications for choices already made, providing apparently Islamic justification for various aspects of the 'war on terror'.
Furthermore, by drawing on de-contextualized quotations from the Qur'an as the sole source of knowledge about Islam, the president promotes an essentialized and privatized notion of religion, as an individual relationship with God, laid down in a single book and unmediated by community, tradition and practice. Not only does he claim authoritative knowledge of Islam for himself and the state, but also he invites a broader discussion of 'Islam' solely through a reading of the Qur'an. While Bush claims there is no relationship between 'true' Islam and the 11 September attacks, his focus on the Qur'an has lent credence to a popular discourse involving non-Muslims' textualist assessments of Muslims' views on controversial issues. Such a view of Islam as transparently accessible via the Qur'an not only privileges text over both belief and practice, but also ignores the many competing traditions of Islamic exegesis.
Bush's discourse seeks to create a distinction between 'friendly' and 'enemy' Islam based on an opposition between 'true' religion and mere ideology, which he describes as 'Islamic extremism' (Office of the Press Secretary 2001a). Many Muslim spokespeople have critiqued all terminology that refers to the 'terrorists' as 'Islamic', arguing along the same line as the president has, that the 11 September attackers 'had no religion. They were aberrations of Islam' (Hanley 2001) . Nevertheless, the president has not dropped this terminology but expanded it to include 'Islamic radicalism', 'militant Jihadism' and perhaps the most controversial term 'Islamo-fascism' (Office of the Press Secretary 2005).
7 'Islamo-fascism' was particularly useful in linking highly divergent secular and religiously-identified 'enemies', such as Iran and Syria or Hamas, Hezbollah and al Qaeda. Whether those being named as 'terrorists' see themselves as motivated by primarily religious or secular ends is not relevant. In the face of such complexity, the concept of 'Islamo-fascism' is an argument itself, seeing a mutable malicious ideological expression of 'Islam' as linking an otherwise vast array of threats.
All these conceptions of the enemy maintain some form of Islam, an Islam that has been secularized towards political ends, as the source of current conflicts. A comparable distinction is made in a 2004 publication by the RAND Corporation which takes pains to distinguish its usage of 'Muslim' from 'Islamic' arguing that 'Muslim refers to a religious and cultural reality whereas Islamic denotes political intent' (Rabasa et al. 2004: 433) . Through this innovative boundary drawing, 'Muslim' individuals, countries, and organizations are those who just happen to be Muslim, whose religiosity is appropriately contained in the private realm, whereas 'Islamic' comes to mark an association with the political sphere. This discourse serves to position the United States as in a war against an anti-modern, politicized pseudo-religion, and therefore in the interest of those who are 'truly' Muslim. Mamdani (2004) locates the fallacy of these types of explanations in the continued focus on culture, rather than politics and history, as the main determinant of 'terrorism'. Unanalyzed throughout these statements is the history of US intervention in and militarization of the Middle East and South Asia. The US's claim to be on the side of 'true' Islam is ironic given its history of promotion of divergent and often competing 'Islamist' movements as part of its efforts to gain power in the region during and since the Cold War. What Mamdani calls 'culture talk' not only distracts from this history, but aims to focus Muslim Americans' attention on reforming religion, rather than challenging the war in Afghanistan (or Iraq) or domestic policing of Muslims and Arabs. The president calls on Muslim Americans to prove that their religion 'is peace' while simultaneously dismissing Islam's vocabulary of justice with which they might counter war.
However, even when the history of US involvement in Afghanistan and the Middle East is articulated it rarely does more than situate the (Western) speaker as sympathetic to the 'plight' of Muslims. Rudy (2007: 38) argues that the 'war on terror' discourse can be complex: it often emphasizes Muslim diversity, draws on anthropological, historical and contextual knowledge, acknowledges political and economic grievances, and lets 'the Other speak'. Indeed the discourse has responded to many of Said's (2003 Said's ( [1978 ) critiques of Orientalism and made central Said's rejoinder to Huntington's clash of civilizations theory: that the clash is within, rather than between, civilizations (Mamdani 2004: 21) . Rather than essentializing Islam, Rudy (2007: 40) says this new racism manifests in a 'misapprehension of Islamism', seeing legitimate grievances as resulting in disproportionate and irrational responses from Muslims -if only a small minority of them -who then demonstrate the uniquely antimodern character of Islam. Complexity, historicism and contextualization may be allowed to enter the analysis but not to undermine a coherent conception of the 'Islamist' threat and, in the final analysis, terrorism is again reduced to culture.
THE GENDER LITMUS TEST
Within this discourse about Islam, perspectives on women in Islam have become essential to distinguishing the civilized from the uncivilized, the modern from the anti-modern, or Bush's truly religious Muslims from the blasphemous terrorists. A 2003 RAND Corporation publication entitled Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies sets forth a multi-tiered taxonomy of Islam to assist policymakers in distinguishing and identifying Islamic interpretations that deserve state support from those that do not (Benard 2003) . The taxonomy categorizes Islamic interpretations on a range of 'key value and lifestyle issues' that are said to correspond with one's hidden beliefs on violence. As Benard says, while it is possible for groups to dissimulate concerning their attitude to violence, to avoid persecution and sanctions, it is really not possible for them to distort or deny their views on key value and lifestyle issues. These are what define them and attract new members. (Benard 2003: 6) These key value issues include beliefs on women's dress, women's participation in public life, polygamy, and whether men may beat their wives, and the taxonomy categorizes specific Islamic interpretations as compatible or incompatible with modernity. This document demonstrates how religion as belief system (rather than solely as ethnic marker) has become an object of concern in the 'war on terror'. Furthermore, without advocating for women's rights per se, RAND makes gender-based issues a crude test for anti-modern and violent leanings, declaring huge portions of self-identified Muslims as potential threats. In making perspectives on hijab (modest Muslim clothing, particularly the headscarf) or women's role in public life a litmus test for potentially terroristic proclivities, the RAND Corporation adds another dimension to Western discourses about the oppression of Muslim and third world women. Indeed, there is a long history of Western colonialists and liberal feminist discourses about third world women in need of liberation from patriarchal traditions imposed by third world men (see, e.g., Spivak 1988; Mohanty 1991; Abu-Lughod 2002) . Contrary to a sociological understanding of gender norms and structures as being rooted in complex socioeconomic and political factors (Moghadam 2003) , this reductive understanding sees the status of women in Muslim-majority societies as primarily being rooted in Islamic beliefs and culture. For example, many analyses of the situation of women under the Taliban in Afghanistan ignored the factors of militarization, poverty, the drug trade and social disintegration, granting all explanatory power to the concept of 'Islamic fundamentalism'. They also reduced the diversity of Islamist politics, leading to an equation between such figures as conservative madrassa teachers, the Taliban and the 11 September attackers (Mahmood and Hirschkind 2002) . 'Saving Muslim Women' from Islam and authoritarianism has served as one justification of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (and possible war in Iran), but has faded from public discourse once such 'liberation' proved elusive. Within the discourse about US Muslims, the figures of concern have been more highly contested. The need to cast a hegemonic 'American Islam' as modern has necessitated bringing forward Muslim women to attest to the fact that they are not oppressed and that their religion is not a threat to the United States. However, ambivalence within public discourse about whether such women are truly liberated leads to instability around the question of whether US Muslims are 'appropriately' modern and unthreatening.
CONSTITUTING MUSLIM PATRIOTS
Many scholars (Howell and Shryock 2003; Schumann 2007) have noted that the period since 11 September 2001 has been marked by an intensification of the processes of exclusion and integration of Muslim Americans, a process which has been deeply gendered. In the name of security, the state has targeted Muslims and Arabs with surveillance, profiling and policing, while at the same time it has sought to assimilate these populations through symbolic acts of inclusion and opposition to hate crimes. Of course, as Puar and Rai (2002: 130) have argued, a dual process of 'incorporation' and 'quarantining' has been applied more broadly and not solely to Muslims. They describe how through the otherizing and quarantining of 'terrorists' in the figure of the 'terrorist-monster-fag', Sikh and queer populations are normalized, disciplined and produced as 'patriotic, docile subjects'.
With 11 September, a largely invisible population in the US -some of whom did not primarily identify along religious lines -was suddenly the centre of great scrutiny and attention, called upon by the press, the public, liberal NGOs and academics to speak as 'Muslims' or 'Muslim Americans'. In the year following the attacks, newspaper and television portrayals of Muslim Americans and Arab Americans not only increased dramatically, but also became more in-depth, contextualized and sympathetic with 'a wave of reports highlight [ing] (McAlister 2005) . In addition, in the 1990s there was an increasing perception of Arabs and Muslims as potential domestic threats, as evident in initial responses to the Oklahoma City Bombing and in the drafting and application of the 1996 anti-terrorism law. The 1990s also saw the formation of national level Muslim American organizations which were seeking greater visibility and acceptance (Moore 2007) .
Many of these Muslim organizations commended the president's speeches immediately after 11 September as helping to stem hate crimes. While the president's 17 September 'Islam is peace' speech was ostensibly a demonstration of goodwill toward Muslims and a plea to Americans to distinguish Muslim citizens from the 'enemies' or 'terrorists', the speech was productive in other ways (Office of the Press Secretary 2001c). In the speech, the president identifies and increases focus on 'American Muslims' as a unified and meaningful category of distinction, in direct association with the attacks. Bush does not emphasize that hate crimes are never tolerated but rather focuses on painting a picture of upright Muslim citizens who pay taxes, contribute economically and socially to the nation, and (as he says in a later speech) pledge allegiance to the flag 'just as hard . . . as I do' (Office of the Press Secretary 2001d). Implicit in the speech is the necessity to establish Muslims as patriotic contributors to the nation in order to argue against hate crimes.
Bush also specifies Muslim women, specifically 'women who cover', as objects of tolerance who particularly need protection, as he says, so they may feel comfortable to leave their homes and go about their daily chores of shopping (Office of the Press Secretary 2001c). These women are not only associated with the domestic sphere but do not speak for themselves. Rather, Bush indicates that he has been told of their fears by others, presumably the group of predominantly Muslim men who surround him at the podium. The president as patriarch of the nation steps forward to offer protection to the vulnerable women of lesser patriarchs as a gesture of their belonging to the national family. As such he dismisses the gendered scrutiny of Arab and Muslim men who were disproportionately the targets of state surveillance and policing. Furthermore, through this language of 'women who cover' that strips the hijab of any significance or contentiousness, the United States becomes a place of tolerance and protection of an empty difference, as compared to Western Europe where the over-signification of the hijab has led to intolerance. What emerges in this speech is a particular notion of what it means to be American, as enlightened and tolerant, with a chivalrous, protective orientation towards women and religious minorities.
Since these statements, Muslim American women have been called on more directly to act as representatives of and bridge builders for the state. The State Department has actively engaged in projecting a particular image of the United States through various public relations efforts especially targeting Muslimmajority countries.
8 Their efforts indicate a shift from a focus on the patriarchal family as the locus of Muslim American life to a new interest in the 'devout, but liberated, Muslim woman' who speaks for herself. A 2002 publication called Muslim Life in America, which has been translated into Arabic, Russian and Spanish, introduces its readers to Muslim life in the US through 'the family', which it describes as '[a]t the center of both traditional American life and the lives of the generally more recent Muslim immigrants' (Clack and McDonald 2002) . It also presents the United States as not only compatible with Islam but perhaps the best place to practice Islam. As Mrs Tagouri, the wife and mother of three in the family profiled, says: 'we can practice our religion more freely here than probably anywhere else in the world' (McIntosh 2002) .
In the last year, the State Department has shifted its focus and drawn on independent and accomplished Muslim American women in spreading this representation of the United States abroad. It has presented three women to participate in webchats with audiences abroad, particularly in Muslimmajority countries. Two of these women, Fatina Abdrabboh, a Harvard University graduate student of Islamic studies and international security who is of unspecified Arab descent, and Tayibbah Taylor, editor-in-chief of Azizah magazine (a glossy US magazine for Muslim women) who is of Caribbean descent, have also served in a State Department international speaker program. The third woman, Kareema Dauod, a Georgetown graduate student in Arabic linguistics of Palestinian and German descent, works on public diplomacy in the Middle East for the State Department. The first two women are pictured wearing headscarves while Dauod is bareheaded; however Dauod is the only one who sprinkles her speech with common Arabic phrases that can have a religious inflection. While Taylor also notes the importance of Islamic tradition, her emphasisand that of all three women 10 -is on the United States as providing the ground on which greater spirituality can be achieved, making implicit or explicit contrast to Muslim-majority countries and Europe. These women also highlight the US as offering an exceptional degree of freedom to Muslim women, arguing as Abdrabboh (2007) does that, 'Muslim women in America have the choice as to everything and anything they want to adapt to . . . the diversity of Muslim women in America is a testament to the extent to which they have agency and choice in their religious observance ' (2007) . An uninterrogated concept of 'freedom' becomes the framework through which the United States is constructed, without any conception of how the US context is also shaping and delimiting Islam.
Indeed, this conception of the United States as a country that is particularly conducive to the practice of a 'truer' Islam is not one that the US government originated but has many proponents among Muslim American public figures (Bagby 2006) . For example, a recent collection of essays entitled Taking Back Islam: American Muslims Reclaim Their Faith (Wolfe 2002 ) includes numerous statements to this effect, one author going so far as to say, 'Islam in America is probably closer to the true teachings of the Prophet Muhammad than anywhere else at any other time in the last five hundred years' (Emerick 2002: 197). 11 Although this or similar views may be sincerely held by somethough certainly not all -Muslims in the United States, its proliferation is linked to a framing of the 'war on terror' that seeks to produce 'patriotic, docile subjects'. It shifts attention away from how US involvement in Muslimmajority countries -especially through support of authoritarian leaders and movements -has in fact inhibited democratic change and religious freedom in these societies. It also ignores the very real forms of state and social policing that limit Muslims' options within the United States.
Indeed, these State Department spokespeople downplay the degree of state and public scrutiny, surveillance and violence that Muslims in the US have experienced. They insist that any problems that exist in the US are a result of 'ignorance' which as Dauod (2006) says cannot be described as 'Islamophobia' but is merely 'a lack of education'. Taylor, similarly insists that the greatest challenge Muslim women in the US face is the misconceptions that people hold, which she sees her magazine as challenging, while also noting that the magazine does not deal with foreign policy or civil liberties issues. By focusing solely on educating others about Islam these women ignore the power relations that not only place the onus for education on Muslims but also paint current conflicts in what they see as purely ideological, and not material or historical, terms.
These statements feed into a concept of American exceptionalism. The United States becomes an exceptional land of freedom, where the 'American Dream' comes true for all who work hard and where pure religion is practiced as nowhere else. Muslim Americans also become exceptional in that they practice an Islam that is very different from the presumably stagnating and overly politicized Islam of European and Muslim-majority countries. As such this discourse contributes to President Bush's image of an authorized 'true' Islam, restricting the space of legitimate religious expression. Women become the carriers and messengers of an enlightened 'American Islam' that is free from oppressive cultural norms or political control. The proliferation of this perspective has constituted a narrow space in which one may be a Muslim and not a 'terrorist'. In these statements, a depoliticized 'true' Islam, women's conscious religiosity and an unquestioned pro-Americanism are made to go hand-in-hand.
'AMERICAN ISLAM'
This emerging exceptional 'American Islam' has begun to hold a special position in discussions about the potential for change in Islam abroad. As a Muslim jurist highlighted on the State Department website, argues, 'Muslims all over the world are looking with high expectations toward the ummah community [community of believers] in the United States and Canada. Its dynamism, fresh approach, enlightened scholarship and sheer growth is their hope for an Islamic renaissance worldwide' ('Living in Two Cultures' 2002). Whether or not Muslims across the world are seeing North American Muslims as the hope for the future, this vision of 'American Islam' corresponds with a broader policy goal articulated by the RAND Corporation in its call for 'religion-building' and 'transform[ation]' of Islam, which is deemed key to stemming the so-called 'crisis' in Islam and violence originating in the Muslim-majority world (Benard 2003: ix) . The RAND Corporation argues that reform efforts should be directed to youth, women and 'Muslim moderates in countries where conditions are more favorable' and that through them channels should be created into more 'difficult' regions, particularly the Middle East (Rabasa et al. 2007: 85) . More to the point, they say 'American Muslims, with their cultural knowledge and family and social links to their home countries, could be a critical vector in the war of ideas within the Muslim world ' (2007: 89) .
Therefore policies addressing Muslims in the US must be understood in the context of practices and policies that address Muslims globally. Mahmood (2006) , also analyzing RAND Corporation and State Department publications and policies, has noted that in relation to Muslims abroad, the administration 'has embarked upon an ambitious theological campaign aimed at shaping the sensibilities of ordinary Muslims ' (2006: 329) with the goal of constituting 'certain kinds of religious subjectivities . . . so as to render them compliant to liberal political rule ' (2006: 328) . In this approach, the administration promotes a small group of Muslim reformists, including those critical of US foreign policy. These reformists are distinguishable in their hermeneutic approach to Islam, which dismisses traditional authority and practice and presents religion as abstracted beliefs that ought to be subjected to individual reason (2006: 333) .
Within this framework, the 2003 RAND Corporation publication Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies calls for promoting an appropriate Islam partly by 'eliciting, expressing, [and] "codifying"' Western variants of Islam (Benard 2003: 62) . It describes such specific tactics as representing secularism either as a countercultural alternative or as a force that will strengthen religion, supporting certain Islamic scholars, encouraging moderate views in Islamic education and exposing 'inaccuracies' in some interpretations of Islam (2003: xi -xii) . The author even argues for the state intervening in Islamic jurisprudence by presenting new interpretations of the Prophetic tradition by distributing a body of what she terms 'counterhadiths' on contentious topics (Benard 2003: 54 -5) . These recommendations obviously belie a notion of the secular state as primarily focused on refraining from interfering in the autonomous sphere of religion.
The publication does warn that '"religion-building" is immeasurably more perilous and complex' than 'nation-building' as it is necessary to make difficult distinctions between 'benign strains within Islam' that should be supported and dangerous forms of Islam, in the context of 'opposing terrorists ' (2003: 3) . As already noted, women's rights have become one significant barometer of 'appropriate' Islam. Read in combination with various approaches of the Bush administration, this publication highlights the contested terrain of women's bodies as a boundary between different versions of 'American Islam' being promoted as in the state's interests.
The question of hijab is particularly illuminating in this regard. The author of one RAND Corporation publication is highly critical of the Bush administration's attempt to use representations of women wearing headscarves as a means of depicting the US as tolerant toward Muslims. Her main objection is that this representation aligns the administration with traditionalists and fundamentalists, saying that even a neutral position toward hijab will potentially 'harm modernist forces' (Benard 2003: 58) . She proclaims that the '"hijab" is neither a neutral lifestyle issue nor a religious requirement' but a 'political statement ' (2003: 57) that is against American culture and unequivocally 'associated with female subordination ' (2003: 58) . She describes those who wear it in the US as either fundamentalists, unassimilated traditionalists or 'young women who want to get attention and make a provocative statement . . . ' (2003: 58) . Key to her argument however is that the hijab should be read as a sign of a deeper threat, marking the terrain of fundamentalism's expansion. As the author says, 'fundamentalists signal their advances by immediately imposing the head covering on women wherever they gain in strength and influence ' (2003: 59) .
In stark contrast to this representation is that of the Muslim American women on the State Department website, two of whom are shown in their photographs wearing headscarves. These women repeatedly describe the ability of Muslim women to wear hijab in the US as a sign of religious freedom. They argue that women in the US are not legally restricted in their wearing of hijab ('No one has the right to tell you to not wear your hijab in the USA', Dauod (2007) says), nor do they face hostility from other Americans should they choose to wear hijab.
12 Abdrabboh (2007) emphasizes the notion that the hijab should be read in the US as a sign of women's agency and a symbol of American freedoms, saying, 'many young Muslim women in America take pride in a) their choice to cover their hair and b) the freedom to express such a choice in this country ' (2007) .
Here we see a clear distinction in management approaches towards Islam: one that begins from a more liberal secular perspective (the RAND Corporation) and another from a conservative, pro-religion perspective (the Bush administration's State Department). Indeed the native informant spokespeople for a RAND Corporation position can be found in such high profile secular Muslim women as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Irshad Manji, Wafa Sultan and Azar Nafisi. These women tell a very different story than the State Department spokespeople, focusing on Muslim women's oppression in Muslim-majority countries and often expressing concern for the plight of immigrant Muslim women in the West (see, e.g., Rastegar 2006; El-Arisa 2007) . They seek either significant transformation in Islamic belief and practice or a complete abandonment of religion altogether. Their messages, in the form of bestselling books, speaking engagements and television broadcasts, have circulated more broadly than those of such 'devout' Muslim women, indicating that while the Bush administration presents an image of Muslim patriotism with which they hope pious Muslim Americans (and perhaps Muslims abroad) will identify, the RAND Corporation's conception of Islam is closer to the predominant image within broader public discourse.
Nevertheless although these two sources present opposing positions on the hijab-wearing Muslim woman, they both frame the hijab as a sign that stands in for a relationship to the state. In both cases, there is great investment in constructing an authorized 'American Islam' which can be opposed to other lesser or 'enemy' versions, that are cast as culturally backward, anti-modern, undemocratic or inappropriately politicized. As such, both the RAND corporation and the State Department participate in constructing the boundaries of a better or truer Islam, even against each other. Furthermore, we see that the same woman, the woman in hijab, is alternately made to signify the patriot or the terrorist.
13 She takes pride in her freedoms in this country or she signals the advancing 'fundamentalist' threat. These representations in fact work together, and it is through the threat of being deemed a terrorist, that the state garners Muslims' consent in their patriotic incorporation.
CONCLUSION
If the United States is fertile ground for Islamic reform, it is not because of neutrality and non-interference of the state or because of the 'freedom' of Muslims to speak and be heard as they seek to 'reform' Islam. Rather the state is very much concerned with managing religion in such a way that it can be harnessed toward maintaining state power. The state is engaged in a politics of representation that seeks to demonstrate US exceptionality as a free place where 'true' Islam is able to flourish. Not only the 'hearts and minds', but also the 'bodies and souls', of Muslims in the US have become objects of state power. They are addressed both through policing and surveillance, and through state-supported discourses that seek to reinterpret religious understandings, delimit religious possibilities and shape religious and citizen subjectivities. US Muslims have been presented as exceptional carriers of a 'truer' Islam that can promote positive change in the broader Muslim world. Nevertheless, as a RAND Corporation publication warns, 'the American Muslim community is not immune to the global conflict of ideas within Islam. Like other minority Muslim communities, it is subject to radical influences from abroad' (Rabasa et al. 2007: 89) .
14 As such the patriotic integration of Muslims never eradicates the underlying 'threat' that justifies continual policing, thereby leading to the creation of a narrow, precarious space for Muslim subjects as either patriotic citizens or threats to the nation.
Throughout this process, Muslim women have been called on to act as representatives of this emerging enlightened 'American Islam' and issues of gender relations have come to stand in as a standard for whether a particular version of Islam is in line with US interests. In reading positions on gender issues as a litmus test for pro-Western or anti-Western Islam, gender struggles are further politicized in such a way that women working for change are increasingly at risk of being branded as supporters of US imperial interests. Women's bodies become a symbolic battleground in the processes of boundary creation between the 'civilized' and the rest, and also between those to be incorporated and those to be excluded. Notes 1 According to classical secularization theory, 'modernization' led to the marginalization of religion from other social spheres and increasing pluralism and relativism resulted in the undermining of religious truths (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002) . Qualifications to this theory came from some sociologists who pointed out the persistence of individual religiosity, especially in the US (Bellah 1991 (Bellah [1970 ; Stark and Bainbridge 1987) . More recently, early proponents of traditional secularization theory have begun to question whether it is generalizable at all (Berger 1999 ). 2 Acknowledging the recurring mobilization of Protestant Fundamentalism in US history, Casanova says that 'properly speaking, public religion in America has not functioned at the level of mobilized political society . . .
[and] the American party system was not organized along strict denominational or secular-religious cleavages ' (1994: 136) . 3 Disestablishment of religion, however, was not true of many early state constitutions within the US that had established religions and religious tests for public office holders (Borden 1984) . 4 The need to delimit the boundaries of religion in order to 'secularize' the state has been clearly elucidated in analyses of postcolonial contexts such as India (Smith 1999; Chatterjee 1999 God's will). 10 This sentiment is further highlighted by the other two women. 'I thank God that we have the freedom to practice our religion freely in the United States', as Dauod (2007) says. Abdrabboh (2007) remarks, 'I consider myself very fortunate to be an American and a Muslim, and I thank God everyday that I can be botheasily'. 11 Further examples include: 'access to pure Islamic teachings and the ability to live them to their fullest moral and social potential is more pronounced in America than it has been for centuries in Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, or anywhere else' (Emerick 2002: 197) ; and Salam al-Marayati's description of a speaker at a Muslim Public Affairs council conference who 'presented the thesis that the US Constitution is the closest human document that fulfills the goals of shari'a. His message was well-received by all one thousand participants ' (2002: 80) . 12 Taylor insists that when women who wear hijab are questioned in public 'it is definitely not a negative experience' because people are merely curious and the situation offers an opportunity for education (Taylor 2007) . 13 This process parallels what Puar and Rai (2004) describe as the disciplining panopticon and accusatory profile that combine to 'simultaneously produce the terrorist and the patriot in one body, the turbaned body' of the Sikh man (2004: 82) . 14 This double-edged representation is apparent in a recent NEWSWEEK poll that found that while 63 per cent of Americans believe that Muslims do not condone violence, a majority also worried about 'radicals within the American Muslim community' (54 per cent) and favor wiretapping of mosques (52 per cent) (Braiker 2007 ).
